This graphic from Bloomberg shows improving efficiency in the US car and truck market.
Another shows change in global oil intensity and China demand growth:
* * *
Peter Waldman, "Saudi Arabia's Plan to Extend the Age of Oil," Bloomberg, April 12, 2015
Notes Toward a Better Understanding of Six Intersecting Pieces of the Energy Puzzle: Climate Change, Peak Resources, Nuclear Proliferation, Food Security, Speculative Finance, and Geopolitics
April 14, 2015
Climate Change and Brain-Eating Parasites
Joe Romm of Climate
Progress details the impact of climate change on global health:
It’s a myth there are no big
winners from climate change besides fossil fuel companies.
According to one study, global
warming is doubling
bark beetle mating, triggering up to 60 times as many beetles attacking
trees every year. The decline in creatures with shells thanks to ocean
acidification “could trigger an explosion
in jellyfish populations.” And climate change has helped dengue
fever, which spread to 28 U.S. states back in 2009.
Of course, invasive plants will
become “even
more dominant in the landscape.” And who doesn’t love ratsnakes?
Let’s also not forget brain-eating
parasites, which are expected to thrive as U.S. lakes heat up. That
parasite — the amoeba, Naegleria fowleri — feasts on human
brains like a tiny zombie. As one Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
expert warned several
years ago: “This is a heat-loving amoeba. As water temperatures go up, it does
better. In future decades, as temperatures rise, we’d expect to see more
cases.”
But this is just a taste of things
to come, as two parasite experts explain in a recent
article, “Evolution in action: climate change, biodiversity dynamics and
emerging infectious disease [EID].” That article is part of a special April
issue of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B., whose
theme is “Climate change and vector-borne diseases of humans.”
“The appearance of infectious
diseases in new places and new hosts, such as West Nile virus and Ebola, is a
predictable result of climate change,” as the news
release explains. The article examines our “current EID crisis.”
Coauthor Daniel R. Brooks explains:
“It’s not that there’s going to be one ‘Andromeda Strain’ that will wipe
everybody out on the planet,” he said, referring to the deadly fictional
pathogen. But he warns: “There are going to be a lot of localized outbreaks
that put a lot of pressure on our medical and veterinary health systems. There
won’t be enough money to keep up with all of it. It will be the death of a
thousand cuts.”
Many tropical diseases are tropical
because their insect or animal host prefer warmer climates. A 2015
report on neglected tropical diseases by the World Health Organization
(WHO) pointed out that “climate variability and long-term climate changes in
temperature, rainfall and relative humidity are expected to increase the
distribution and incidence of at least a subset of these diseases.” For
instance, WHO notes, “dengue has already re-emerged in countries in which it
had been absent for the greater part of the last century.”
The Congressionally-mandated 2014 National
Climate Assessmentconcurs: “Large-scale changes in the environment due to
climate change and extreme weather events are increasing the risk of the
emergence or reemergence of health threats that are currently uncommon in the
United States, such as dengue fever.”
“Some of the neglected tropical
diseases are no longer strictly tropical,” said Dr. Dirk Engels, the director
WHO’s Department of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, in a
statement.
Certainly there have been major
advances in the fight against many tropical diseases, but those are primarily
due to medical advances and investments in public health. Such investments
remain a top priority in a warming world. But the kind of extreme climate
change humanity faces on our current path of unrestricted carbon pollution
makes the job harder for all those focused on public health around the world.
* * *
Joe Romm, “If
You Like Brain-Eating Parasites and Dengue Fever, You’ll Love Climate Change,”
Climate Progress, April 14, 2015.
The following is from the introduction to the academic study
Romm mentions, “Climate
change and vector-borne diseases of humans.”
This theme issue arose out of our
perception that while it is widely recognized that an important impact of
climate change on human health is likely to be via effects on vector-borne
disease (VBD) transmission, the complexity of the biological and non-biological
susceptibility modifying pathways by which such effects arise and combine to influence
transmission is less well understood. This has made reliable appraisals of the
potential effects of climate change and variability on VBDs complicated and
represents a serious problem in developing more robust tools to assess the risk
of climate change affecting VBDs in populations residing under different social
and geographic contexts. This issue thus aims to provide not only an up-to-date
synthesis of current knowledge of, and key research in, the impact of various
individual components of climate change (biological, non-biological,
evolutionary and economic factors), but also, crucially, to reveal and
highlight the need (and potential means) to address the effects of multiple
factor interactions, nonlinearities and human reflexivity if we are to develop
and establish a more rigorous agenda for future research, including the
provision of useful informatics for informed public health policy-making, in
this important area of climate change studies.
* * *
April 1, 2015
Sinopec: Peak Diesel in China Coming Soon
A new report from Bloomberg conveys surprising forecasts from Sinopec, whose chairman predicts a peak in diesel and gas
consumption in China:
* * *
China’s biggest oil refiner is
signaling the nation is headed to its peak in diesel and gasoline consumption
far sooner than most Western energy companies and analysts are forecasting.
If correct, the projections by
China Petroleum & Chemical Corp., or Sinopec, a state-controlled enterprise
with public shareholders in Hong Kong, pose a big challenge to the world’s
largest oil companies. They’re counting on demand from China and other
developing countries to keep their businesses growing as energy consumption
falls in more advanced economies.
“Plenty of people are talking about
the peak in Chinese coal, but not many are talking about the peak in Chinese
diesel demand, or Chinese oil generally,” said Mark C. Lewis, an analyst at
Kepler Cheuvreux in Paris who has written on how oil companies should broaden
their activities to produce all forms of energy. “It is shocking.”
Sinopec has offered a view of the
country that should serve as a reality check to any oil bull. For diesel, the
fuel that most closely tracks economic growth, the peak in China’s demand is
just two years away, in 2017, according to Sinopec Chairman Fu Chengyu, who
gave his outlook on a little reported March 23 conference call. The high point
in gasoline sales is likely to come in about a decade, he said, and the company
is already preparing for the day when selling fuel is what he called a
“non-core” activity.
That forecast, from a company whose
30,000 gas stations and 23,000 convenience stores arguably give it a better
view on the market than anyone else, runs counter to the narrative heard
regularly from oil drillers from the U.S. and Europe that Chinese demand for
their product will increase for decades to come.
Rising Forecasts
“From 2010 to 2040, transportation
energy needs in OECD32 countries are projected to fall about 10 percent while
in the rest of the world these needs are expected to double,” Exxon Mobil Corp.
said in a December report on its view of the future. “China and India will
together account for about half of the global increase.”
Exxon expects most of that growth
to be driven by commercial transportation for heavy-duty vehicles, specifically
ships, trucks, planes and trains that run on diesel and similar fuels.
BP Plc’s latest public projection
for China, released in February, sounds a similar note. “Energy consumed in
transport grows by 98 percent. Oil remains the dominant fuel but loses market
share, dropping from 90 percent to 83 percent in 2035.”
The oil companies aren’t alone in
their view. The International Energy Agency in Paris, the adviser to 29
governments including the U.S., forecasts China’s oil demand is most likely to
increase at least through 2040.
Slowdown Signs
But signs of China’s energy
slowdown are already evident. Diesel demand declined last year, and growth in
crude oil consumption has shriveled. Crude use is projected to rise about 3
percent this year, less than half the rate of the total economy.
Also, China’s political leadership
is trying to wean the economy off debt-fueled property investment and old-line
smokestack industries, shifting toward services and domestic-consumption led
growth.
Sinopec itself is already planning
for the time when its primary business isn’t selling fuels but consumer goods
at its shops and filling stations that blanket the nation.
“In the future, fuels will become a
non-core business of Sinopec,” Fu said on the conference call. “Petroleum or
oil and gas will continue to be a major energy source in the future, but they
won’t be the only source, more emphasis will be put on our new energy and
alternative energies.”
* * *
Timothy Coulter, “China’s Fuel Demand to Peak Sooner ThanOil Giants Expect,” BloombergBusiness, April 1, 2015
January 21, 2015
Gold-Oil Ratio at Extreme Level
One of the most reliable of financial indicators has just reached a crucial level, indicating a likely turn in the markets. I speak of the gold/oil ratio, an idea first introduced to me back in the 1980s in a book by John Dessauer (the title of which escapes me). The long term gold-oil ratio is something like fifteen. As the following chart indicates, it has reached a level just shy of 28. Over the last twenty years, it reached this level three separate times, and on each occasion fell promptly back to earth.
Those inclined to immediately rush out and buy oil and sell gold may duly be warned that the gold-oil ratio did reach nearly 33 on two occasions in the 1980s (though in neither case was it there for very long). However, it is rather impressive that in late 1993, in early 1999, and in early 2009, it reached the precise level at which it now sits, and that in each case the 28 level constituted the turning point in the price action. This must surely count as an extremely strong line of resistance.
But there is another anomaly that makes the picture even more interesting from a financial standpoint. Though gold is extremely expensive in relation to oil, gold stocks are still very cheap in relation to oil stocks. Consider the following chart looking at the ratio of the $HUI, a gold stock index, with the $XOI, an oil stock index. The data here go back to 1996:
Given what has happened to the gold-oil ratio, one would think that the gold stock-oil stock ratio should be closer to the top of the chart than to the bottom. For gold miners, oil is a very considerable cost of doing business, so a decrease in oil prices increases their profit margins (at least, what there is of them). As the chart shows, there has been a very considerable rally in the gold stock-oil stock ratio, from .10 to .16 over the last six months, but these were from very depressed levels. Given the gold-oil ratio in the first chart above, this suggests that the gold stock-oil stock ratio has much further to run, that is, that gold stocks will do much better than oil stocks over the next year or so.
The conclusion suggested by these two charts is that one should go long oil and short gold, and long the gold stocks and short the oil stocks.
Just to round out our look at these various ratios, here's two other charts that reinforce the conclusion that oil is a lot cheaper than the oil stocks, and that gold stocks are a lot cheaper than gold.
One note of caution. Going long oil is tricky because the oil market is in contango. That is, the contracts further away from the immediate month are more expensive. The most widely traded oil fund (USO), an etf that tracks the daily movement of the oil price, will not keep pace with the futures contract when the futures curve is in contango. A way around this is another etf, USL, that buys contracts in equal amounts over the next twelve months, but the gold-oil ratio is not as extreme in the outer months, so it is not clear whether that is the better strategy.
One final chart that puts together these various relationships. Let's call it The Grand Anomaly, a testament to the inefficiency of markets.
I cannot depart the subject without recalling Adam Smith's observation in The Money Game, a popular market book from many years ago. Anyone who has a desire to speculate in the commodities markets should take a nap until the feeling goes away.
Those inclined to immediately rush out and buy oil and sell gold may duly be warned that the gold-oil ratio did reach nearly 33 on two occasions in the 1980s (though in neither case was it there for very long). However, it is rather impressive that in late 1993, in early 1999, and in early 2009, it reached the precise level at which it now sits, and that in each case the 28 level constituted the turning point in the price action. This must surely count as an extremely strong line of resistance.
But there is another anomaly that makes the picture even more interesting from a financial standpoint. Though gold is extremely expensive in relation to oil, gold stocks are still very cheap in relation to oil stocks. Consider the following chart looking at the ratio of the $HUI, a gold stock index, with the $XOI, an oil stock index. The data here go back to 1996:
The conclusion suggested by these two charts is that one should go long oil and short gold, and long the gold stocks and short the oil stocks.
Just to round out our look at these various ratios, here's two other charts that reinforce the conclusion that oil is a lot cheaper than the oil stocks, and that gold stocks are a lot cheaper than gold.
One note of caution. Going long oil is tricky because the oil market is in contango. That is, the contracts further away from the immediate month are more expensive. The most widely traded oil fund (USO), an etf that tracks the daily movement of the oil price, will not keep pace with the futures contract when the futures curve is in contango. A way around this is another etf, USL, that buys contracts in equal amounts over the next twelve months, but the gold-oil ratio is not as extreme in the outer months, so it is not clear whether that is the better strategy.
One final chart that puts together these various relationships. Let's call it The Grand Anomaly, a testament to the inefficiency of markets.
I cannot depart the subject without recalling Adam Smith's observation in The Money Game, a popular market book from many years ago. Anyone who has a desire to speculate in the commodities markets should take a nap until the feeling goes away.
December 20, 2014
Stranded Assets
Leonardo Maugeri is gloating these days, having warned over
the last few years of the possibility that the massive increases in oil supply
capacity “could lead to a glut of overproduction and a steep dip in oil prices”
("The Oil Crash: Why I Was Right," October 21, 2014). Maugeri, a former executive at the Italian oil company Eni and now a researcher
at Harvard, detailed in his 2012 study, “Oil:
The Next Revolution,” the huge increases in investments that were occurring
worldwide:
More recently (October
21, 2014), he writes:
Joseph Schumpeter noted somewhere in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy that one of the great oddities (and virtues) of capitalism is that most entrepreneurs work for free. That is, most businesses fail after their originators devote untold efforts to making them successful. Something like this has occurred in the energy industry. $2.5 trillion in investments in the four years from 2010 to 2014 have brought low prices for consumers and losses to the companies responsible for them. The outcome is astonishing. Digesting its significance will take years.
From 2003 on, oil exploration and production (E and P) worldwide entered a new, impressive investment cycle,
encouraged by ever increasing crude oil prices, private companies’ desperate
need to replace their reserves, the re-emergence of Iraq as a major oil player,
and the inaccurate but still widespread perception that oil is bound to become
a rare commodity.
That cycle reached the status of a
boom between in 2010 and 2011, when the oil industry invested more than $1
trillion worldwide to explore and develop new resources. According to Barclays’
Upstream Spending Review, 2012 might represent a new all-time record since the
1970s in terms of E&P investments, with a conservative estimate of slightly
less than $600 billion. . . .
My field-by-field analysis suggests
that worldwide, an additional unrestricted supply of slightly less than 50 mbd
is under development or will be developed by 2020. Eleven countries show a
potential outflow of new production of about 40.5 mbd, or about 80 percent of
the total. After adjusting the world’s additional unrestricted production for
taking into account risk-factors, the additional adjusted supply comes to 28.6
mbd , or 22.5 mbd for the first eleven countries – as shown in Figure 3.
Maugeri’s main conclusion was as follows (italics in
original):
[T]he
single most important issue that emerges from my analysis is that, from a
purely physical and technical point of view, oil supply and capacity are not in
any danger. On the contrary, they could significantly exceed world consumption
needs and even lead to a phase of oil overproduction if oil demand does not
exceed a compounded rate of growth of 1.6 percent each year to 2020.
After a cycle of strong investments
in oil and gas exploration and development started in 2003, since 2010 an
investment super-cycle took shape: over four years, national and international
oil companies spent more than 2,500 billion dollars just in the ‘upstream’
hydrocarbons sector (oil and gas exploration and production).
That was an absolute historical
record for the sector, even in the presence of a specific inflationary pressure
which more than doubled upstream costs in the course of a decade. Much of that
investment has produced, or will produce, results with a considerable time-lag,
since in the oil industry it takes years to bring a given field to production.
The result is that new production
capacity, or simple resilient capacity from mature fields, is progressively
made available just while oil demand remains weak due to a still gloomy
economic outlook – and will continue to do so. Other factors contribute to
worsen the situation. . . .[T]he overall effect . . . is that global oil
production capacity has been growing too rapidly – and still does: It has
already exceeded 100 mbd (including biofuels and natural gas liquids), whereas
demand is hovering around 92-93 mbd.
In an essay at The
National Interest (“Frack to the
Future”), published in March-April 2014, Maugeri insisted that the shale-oil
boom was transformational and not a temporary bubble: “Even with a steady
decline of crude-oil prices (for example, from $85 a barrel in 2013 to $65 a
barrel in 2017), the United States could be producing 5 million barrels per day
(MBD) of shale oil by 2017.” Taking together output of biofuels and natural gas
liquids, “the United States could become the leading oil producer in the world
by the end of 2017, with an overall oil production of about 16 MBD and a sheer
crude-oil production of 10.4 MBD.” [The difference between "overall" and "sheer" presumably is made up by biofuels and natural gas liquids.] Shale oil requires
intensive drilling. Maugeri notes that there were 45,468 wells completed in the
United States in 2012, whereas the rest of the world (excluding Canada) only
completed 3,921 wells. Given the long time required to build people-expertise and
equipment in other countries, plus the very different tax and subsurface
ownership regimes, Maugeri doubted that the shale revolution would be exportable, or
at least that much would have to change to make it so.
Despite these cornucopian forecasts, Maugeri noted how it
all might unravel. He explained in The National Interest that Saudi Arabia is “the central bank” of
world oil production. Its choice was either to
cut back production to maintain prices (as it did in the early 1980s) or
engineer a price collapse (as it did in 1986). We now have the results of that
Saudi deliberation in its decision to maintain production, with the resulting
collapse in prices. That scenario, Maugeri noted, “would put in danger both
U.S. shale oil and the more expensive Canadian oil sands. The final result
would be highly detrimental to U.S. energy security.”
Though Maugeri saw, as few others did, the growing imbalance
between supply and demand and noted that the oil sector would be vulnerable to
a collapse in prices, his 2012 analysis of worldwide additional supply seems not to have been predicated on that
scenario. Having seen the future of low prices, he did not integrate that into
his analysis of worldwide production increases. In his 2012 exploration of production in the Western Hemisphere, for example, he noted, "The growing output of Canadian tar sands, the huge
ultra-heavy oil resources of the Venezuelan Orinoco Belt, and the recent
discoveries of Brazil’s ultra-deep offshore pre-salt formations, are all pieces
of the unconventional oil mosaic that, by 2020, could deliver more than 10 mbd
from the Western Hemisphere alone." He ought to have said that much
of this effort would be deeply uneconomic and would pose a risk to the
financial viability of firms and oil exporting countries worldwide. What he was
really describing in the figure and table reproduced above was not the future of world
oil production but the vast number of stranded assets that were looming on the horizon, made
uneconomic by oversupply. Joseph Schumpeter noted somewhere in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy that one of the great oddities (and virtues) of capitalism is that most entrepreneurs work for free. That is, most businesses fail after their originators devote untold efforts to making them successful. Something like this has occurred in the energy industry. $2.5 trillion in investments in the four years from 2010 to 2014 have brought low prices for consumers and losses to the companies responsible for them. The outcome is astonishing. Digesting its significance will take years.
Unplanned Oil Production Outages
These two charts from the Energy Information Administration (December 2014) show unplanned disruptions to oil production for OPEC and non-OPEC countries. Looking at these charts alone, one would surmise an upward rather than downward pressure on prices.
* * *
Energy Information Administration, Short Term Energy Outlook, December 2014
* * *
Energy Information Administration, Short Term Energy Outlook, December 2014
Breaking Even in Oil Country
The collapse of oil prices (from $107 in June to $55 in December) has
raised a big question of which marginal producers will survive the coming
austerity. The share prices of energy service firms and off-shore drillers have
practically been annihilated, with falls of 80 percent not uncommon among the
smaller firms. In assessing the geopolitical fallout, much depends on the cost
of production, not an easy matter to determine. Herewith a series of charts
attempting to shed light on that question.
The following chart, also from Business Insider, is even better, showing the breakeven cost for every international oil company project through 2020. (The chart was taken from a presentation by Ed Morse, an oil economist for Citigroup.) This plainly shows that oil cannot stay at $55 a barrel indefinitely, that price being well below the breakeven for most international oil company projects.
One more chart from the New York Times reinforces the message from the foregoing. About 80% of planned oil projects would be uneconomical with prices at $60 a barrel. Notes the Times: "A recent study by Goldman Sachs estimates that many large new oil and gas projects being planned around the world will not be commercially viable with oil at $70 per barrel. 'The shale revolution is making $1 trillion worth of new oil projects potentially obsolete,' said Michele della Vigna, a London-based Goldman analyst. 'The industry needs to reduce costs by 30 percent to go ahead with these projects at the current oil price.'”
Given the severity of the price decline, one might surmise that oil production and consumption is badly out of whack. Estimated in news reports at 1 to 2 million barrels a day, the imbalance between production and consumption is barely noticeable in this chart from the Energy Information Administration. The EIA explains: "EIA estimates that global consumption grew by 1.3 million bbl/d in 2013, averaging 90.5 million bbl/d for the year. EIA expects global consumption to grow by 1.0 million bbl/d in 2014 and 0.9 million bbl/d in 2015. Projected global oil-consumption-weighted real gross domestic product (GDP), which increased by an estimated 2.7% in 2013, is projected to grow by 2.7% and 2.9% in 2014 and 2015, respectively."
The breakeven costs are also reviewed in a Goldman chart that is (wittily) annotated by Tom Randall of Bloomberg. Randall explains: "The chart below shows the break-even points for the top 400 new fields and how much future oil production they represent. Less than a third of projects are still profitable with oil at $70. If the unprofitable projects were scuttled, it would mean a loss of 7.5 million barrels per day of production in 2025, equivalent to 8 percent of current global demand."
Another chart in Randall's piece shows the impact of $75 oil on shale production. It's not clear what $55 oil would mean for the America's shale revolution, but the $75 level shows only a 40% drop in growth, not an absolute decline.
* * *
For links to several of these charts, a tip of the hat to Mr. Cain Thaler, "My Worst Day in Three Years," ibankcoin.com, November 28, 2014
The first is from an August 2014 study, “The Economic
Impact of the Permian Basin’s Oil and Gas Industry,” produced by a team of researchers in the
department of Petroleum Engineering at Texas Tech University. It estimates that average
breakeven costs for shale plays have declined by 10 percent since early 2012 and now average $55 a barrel.
The Wall Street Journal took
up the question in October, before the rout in prices. It notes that many
exploration and production companies have already “sunk millions into buying
land and securing licenses and access to infrastructure,” making the “real
benchmark for drilling . . . the return from that point on.” It cites Paul
Goydon, a partner at the Boston Consulting Group, who argues that “production
in the three big shale basins—Bakken, Eagle Ford, and Permian—breaks even at
$60 a barrel or less.” Two years ago, the break-even price was $75. Canada’s
oil sands are much more expensive. Though projects already underway can keep
operating in the short term with oil at $40 a barrel, new projects require a
break-even price of nearly $90 a barrel. (Surely this will have an impact on the economics of the Keystone Pipeline.)
Another estimate prepared by Morgan Stanley appears to give
breakeven prices for North American shale at a higher level than the Texas Tech experts.
This chart, reproduced
by Business Insider, should be compared with one produced a few years ago
by the French oil major Total, which showed estimates for oil shale at over $100 a barrel, well above oil sands and Arctic exploration. The estimates plainly are something of a moving
target.
The following chart, also from Business Insider, is even better, showing the breakeven cost for every international oil company project through 2020. (The chart was taken from a presentation by Ed Morse, an oil economist for Citigroup.) This plainly shows that oil cannot stay at $55 a barrel indefinitely, that price being well below the breakeven for most international oil company projects.
One more chart from the New York Times reinforces the message from the foregoing. About 80% of planned oil projects would be uneconomical with prices at $60 a barrel. Notes the Times: "A recent study by Goldman Sachs estimates that many large new oil and gas projects being planned around the world will not be commercially viable with oil at $70 per barrel. 'The shale revolution is making $1 trillion worth of new oil projects potentially obsolete,' said Michele della Vigna, a London-based Goldman analyst. 'The industry needs to reduce costs by 30 percent to go ahead with these projects at the current oil price.'”
Given the severity of the price decline, one might surmise that oil production and consumption is badly out of whack. Estimated in news reports at 1 to 2 million barrels a day, the imbalance between production and consumption is barely noticeable in this chart from the Energy Information Administration. The EIA explains: "EIA estimates that global consumption grew by 1.3 million bbl/d in 2013, averaging 90.5 million bbl/d for the year. EIA expects global consumption to grow by 1.0 million bbl/d in 2014 and 0.9 million bbl/d in 2015. Projected global oil-consumption-weighted real gross domestic product (GDP), which increased by an estimated 2.7% in 2013, is projected to grow by 2.7% and 2.9% in 2014 and 2015, respectively."
The breakeven costs are also reviewed in a Goldman chart that is (wittily) annotated by Tom Randall of Bloomberg. Randall explains: "The chart below shows the break-even points for the top 400 new fields and how much future oil production they represent. Less than a third of projects are still profitable with oil at $70. If the unprofitable projects were scuttled, it would mean a loss of 7.5 million barrels per day of production in 2025, equivalent to 8 percent of current global demand."
Another chart in Randall's piece shows the impact of $75 oil on shale production. It's not clear what $55 oil would mean for the America's shale revolution, but the $75 level shows only a 40% drop in growth, not an absolute decline.
* * *
For links to several of these charts, a tip of the hat to Mr. Cain Thaler, "My Worst Day in Three Years," ibankcoin.com, November 28, 2014
The 2C Red Line
This piece by Justin
Gillis of the New York Times is part of a series on the most recent climate
negotiations in Lima, Peru. The result of the meeting was preliminary language
intended to keep warming from rising more than 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) beyond the average global temperature at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Gillis
explores where that figure came from, noting its emergence in the 1970s in the
work of Yale economist William Nordhaus and its endorsement in the 1990s by the German
government, the latter among the most active governmental campaigners for action on climate change. Gillis emphasizes the importance of the figure in relation to the melting of the
Greenland ice sheet, and notes that some scientists believe that it is already
beginning to break up.
* * *
. . . A decade of subsequent
research added scientific support to the notion that 2C was a dangerous
threshold. Experts realized, for example, that at some increase in global
temperature, the immense Greenland ice sheet would begin an unstoppable melt,
raising the sea by as much as 23 feet over an unknown period. Their early
calculations suggested that calamity would be unlikely as long as global
warming did not exceed about 1.9 degrees Celsius.
“Risking a loss of the whole Greenland ice
sheet was considered a no-go area,” said Stefan Rahmstorf, head of earth system
analysis at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany. “We
are talking about really sinking a lot of coastal cities.”
As the economic and scientific arguments
accumulated, the Germans managed to persuade other countries to adopt the 2C
target, turning it into official European policy. The proposal was always
controversial, with African countries and island states, in particular, arguing
that it was too much warming and would condemn them to ruin. The island states
cited the potential for a large rise of the sea, and African countries feared
severe effects on food production, among other problems.
But as a practical matter, the 2C
target seemed the most ambitious possible, since it would require virtually
ending fossil fuel emissions within 30 to 40 years. At Cancun in 2010, climate
delegates made 2C one of the organizing principles of negotiations.
The talks culminating in Paris next
year are seen as perhaps the best chance ever to turn that pledge into
meaningful emissions limits, in part because President Obama has gone far
beyond his predecessors in committing the United States, the largest historical
producer of greenhouse gases, to action. That, in turn, has lured China, the
largest current producer, into making its first serious commitments.
Yet even as the 2C target has
become a touchstone for the climate talks, scientific theory and real-world
observations have begun to raise serious questions about whether the target is
stringent enough.
For starters, the world has already
warmed by almost one degree Celsius since the Industrial Revolution. That may
sound modest, but as a global average, it is actually substantial. For any
amount of global warming, the ocean, which covers 70 percent of the earth’s
surface and absorbs considerable heat, will pull down the average. But the
warming over land tends to be much greater, and the warming in some polar
regions greater still.
The warming that has already occurred
is causing enormous damage all over the planet, from dying forests to
collapsing sea ice to savage heat waves to torrential rains. And scientists
realize they may have underestimated the vulnerability of the ice sheets in
Greenland and Antarctica.
Those ice sheets now appear to be
in the early stages of breaking up. For instance, Greenland’s glaciers have
lately been spitting icebergs into the sea at an accelerated pace, and
scientific papers published this year warned that the melting in parts of Antarctica
may already be unstoppable.
“The climate is now out of
equilibrium with the ice sheets,” said Andrea Dutton, a geochemist at the
University of Florida who studies global sea levels. “They are going to melt.”
That could ultimately mean 30 feet,
or even more, of sea level rise, though scientists have no clear idea of how
fast that could happen. They hope it would take thousands of years, but cannot
rule out a faster rise that might overwhelm the ability of human society to
adapt.
Given the consequences already
evident, can the 2C target really be viewed as safe? Frightened by what they
are seeing, some countries, especially the low-lying island states, have been
pressing that question with fresh urgency lately.
So, even as the world’s climate
policy diplomats work on a plan that incorporates the 2C goal, they have
enlisted scientists in a major review of whether it is strict enough. Results
are due this summer, and if the reviewers recommend a lower target, that could
add a contentious dimension to the climate negotiations in Paris next year.
Barring a technological miracle, or
a mobilization of society on a scale unprecedented in peacetime, it is not at
all clear how a lower target could be met.
Some experts think a stricter
target could even backfire. If 2C already seems hard to achieve, with the world
on track for levels of warming far beyond that, setting a tighter limit might
prompt political leaders to throw up their hands in frustration.
In practice, moreover, a tighter
temperature limit would not alter the advice that scientists have been giving
to politicians for decades about cutting emissions. Their recommendation is
simple and blunt: Get going now.
“Dealing with this is a little bit
like saving for retirement,” said Richard B. Alley, a climate scientist at
Pennsylvania State University. “All delay is costly, but it helps whenever you
start.”
* * *
Justin Gillis, “3.6
Degrees of Uncertainty,” The New York Times, December 15, 2014December 19, 2014
China's Global Reach in Agriculture
This article by a
Chinese diplomat, Loro Horta, details China’s growing turn to overseas farming.
These excerpts are from Yale Global Online, December 16, 2014
* * *
China is home to 22 percent of the world’s population, but
possesses around 7 percent of its arable land – 334.6 million hectares.
However, in recent years the county’s arable land has been shrinking as a
result of serious environmental damage such as soil erosion, deforestation and
pollution of rivers and lakes. In November Chinese officials reported that more
than 40 percent of China’s arable land is suffering from degradation.
The combination of rising food demand and reduced arable
land makes it difficult for China to feed itself in the not so distant future.
In the past decade China has experienced hikes in food prices and shortages of
certain products.
China has no choice but to turn to overseas farming. In 2013
China imported 4 percent of the world’s grain and this figure is likely to rise
in coming years.
Several Chinese government officials have also talked about
the overseas option as a complement to strengthening domestic production. In
2010, Chinese Minister for Agriculture Han Changfu said, “The time is ripe for
the country’s agricultural companies to embark on a go outward strategy.”
In recent years Chinese investment in overseas agriculture
and land leases has steadily increased. Chinese companies began investing in
neighboring Laos and Cambodia farmland in the early 2000s and slowly ventured
further afield. Chinese-owned or jointly owned farms are in several African
countries including Mozambique and Ethiopia.
In Mozambique, a Hubei-based company has invested $250
million in a rice farm in Gaza province. In November 2013 the country’s
state-owned newspaper Notícias cited Raimundo Matule, a director at the
ministry of agriculture, reporting that several Chinese conglomerates were
expected to invest up to $2.5 billion in the country’s agricultural sector. In
Angola Chinese state-owned giant CITIC pledged to invest $5 billion in
agriculture in addition to its current lease of 20,000 hectares of land in the
former Portuguese colony.
Mozambique and Angola in particular are large countries with
immense tracks of fertile land and a small population. Angola has a land area
of 1.24 million square kilometers and a population of 16 million.
China’s ongoing tensions with its Southeast Asian neighbors
make other parts of the world even more attractive, and Africa could emerge as
a major provider of agricultural products to China in coming years.
Chinese business interests have also leased tracts of land
in Brazil, Peru Argentina and Mexico. China is also reported to be acquiring
land in the sparsely populated Russian Far East just across the border from
heavily populated northern China. Chinese companies are reported to have leased
1 million hectares of land through Russia. China’s most ambitious investment in
the sector is a land lease deal with Ukraine for 3 million hectares to produce
grain and raise pigs. In 2010 Chinese companies were reported to have requested
the lease of 1 million hectares from the Kazak government to plant soybeans and
wheat. In 2010 China was believed to have leased or bought over 2 million
hectares of land abroad. In 2011 China’s largest agriculture group,
Heilongjiang Beidahuang Nongken, announced that it was investing $1.5 billion
to develop 300,000 hectares of land in Rio Negro province in Argentina .
However, the overseas option China is pursuing carries risks
as well as promises of reward. As shown by recent events in the Ukraine, once a
relatively stable part of the world, nothing is guaranteed. Land is a sensitive
issue that touches upon our most primordial fears. In Kazakhstan there is
widespread concern, sometimes bordering on paranoia, that China is grabbing the
country’s vast and sparsely populated land by bribing local officials. In
Brazil several officials including former Minister of Agriculture Delfin Netto
have accused China of carrying out a stealth land grab.
In Mozambique a Chinese land lease in the Limpopo valley is
reported to have displaced 80,000 people, while in Cameron tribal chiefs and
local NGOs have protested against land acquisitions by Chinese companies. In
Angola there have been allegations of physical assault against African farm
labors by their Chinese managers, while such incidents have been isolated
cases. Angola has bitter memories of Portugal’s brutal plantation system in
which the chicote, or whip, was widely used.
China is not alone in its interest for African farmland.
Brazil, Japan, South Korea and several Gulf States have leased large tracks of
land in Africa. Brazil seems to have been far more successful than China, at
least in Mozambique, having acquired 500,000 hectares of land in the country’s
north. Brazilian land deals have been far less controversial than Chinese ones
and elicited less suspicion. Brazilian companies are reported to be producing
soybeans in Mozambique, and for several years, Brazil has been main supplier of
this product to China. It seems that the Brazilians have stolen a march on the
Chinese.
Despite these risks Chinese investment in overseas
agriculture is likely to continue. China has little choice but to turn overseas
to sustain its growing food needs.
However, one must be cautious not to see Chinese
acquisitions of overseas farms as a mere land grab. The issue is far more
complex. China has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in agriculture
research centers throughout Africa that have greatly increase rice and other
crops production and alleviated food shortages. Hundreds of Chinese agriculture
scientists are working in Africa and elsewhere to improve efficiency. While
Africa and other parts of the world are supplying China with products such as
grain, soybeans and meat. China may also contribute to consolidating food
security in Africa and other regions with its investment and expertise. China’s
long-term strategy may be to boost Africa’s capability to produce agriculture
surplus, both addressing the continent’s chronic food shortages and China's
demand for imported food.
Chinese investment in overseas agriculture can bring
significant benefits provided such investments are done in an open and
transparent way and with respect for local communities. Indeed, certain
countries – particularly Angola and Zimbabwe, to mention a few – are keen on
such investments. China and the host countries for such investments can benefit
tremendously – if both sides have the imagination to build mutually beneficial
partnerships.
* * *
Lora Horta, Chinese
Agriculture Goes Global, Yale Global, December 16, 2014December 18, 2014
Oil Bust
The collapse in oil prices since the summer of 2014, accelerating over the last month, promises to have lasting affects on international politics. Provoked by Saudi Arabia's determination to drive down the world price, the oil price collapse is sending out rippling waves that touch the entire planet. Herewith a series of charts intended to put what has happened into perspective.
First off, the fall in prices itself. This chart shows West Texas Intermediate Crude, the benchmark U.S. price. Brent (traded in Europe) was a few years ago at a spread of over $20 dollars a barrel, but the spread is now only 3-4 dollars. Here is a twenty year chart of the price of U.S. oil, followed by a two year chart
Recall that only a few years ago the cost of the marginal barrel of oil was approaching $100, and one gets a sense of how many projects are rendered uneconomic by a price at $55 a barrel. For projects already underway, of course, on which the capital has already been spent, the marginal cost of operating a well is far lower. The longer a low price regime lasts, paradoxically, the greater is likely to be the spurt upwards when it occurs (since future supply will be reduced by the paring back of investment programs in the here and now).
The following chart from the Financial Times (December 15, 2014) shows the dollar cost of net imports and exports from selected countries. The data, though labeled as 2014, comprises totals for the previous four quarters as of the third quarter of 2014. As most of the price drop has occurred in the fourth quarter of 2014, this will dramatically affect the amounts reported in the chart.
Probably the average price of oil over the next year (from the 4th quarter of 2014 to the 4th quarter of 2015) will be higher than $55, but it would not be unreasonable to forecast that revenues for exporters and costs for importers will be some 60-70% of the figures reported above. Even if prices have rebounded six months from now, the interim period will throw the entire sector (and many countries) into crisis. It is in the nature of markets to overshoot; it is not inconceivable (though I think unlikely) that the lows of late 2008 ($35 a barrel) will again be tested.
More to come.
First off, the fall in prices itself. This chart shows West Texas Intermediate Crude, the benchmark U.S. price. Brent (traded in Europe) was a few years ago at a spread of over $20 dollars a barrel, but the spread is now only 3-4 dollars. Here is a twenty year chart of the price of U.S. oil, followed by a two year chart
Recall that only a few years ago the cost of the marginal barrel of oil was approaching $100, and one gets a sense of how many projects are rendered uneconomic by a price at $55 a barrel. For projects already underway, of course, on which the capital has already been spent, the marginal cost of operating a well is far lower. The longer a low price regime lasts, paradoxically, the greater is likely to be the spurt upwards when it occurs (since future supply will be reduced by the paring back of investment programs in the here and now).
The following chart from the Financial Times (December 15, 2014) shows the dollar cost of net imports and exports from selected countries. The data, though labeled as 2014, comprises totals for the previous four quarters as of the third quarter of 2014. As most of the price drop has occurred in the fourth quarter of 2014, this will dramatically affect the amounts reported in the chart.
Probably the average price of oil over the next year (from the 4th quarter of 2014 to the 4th quarter of 2015) will be higher than $55, but it would not be unreasonable to forecast that revenues for exporters and costs for importers will be some 60-70% of the figures reported above. Even if prices have rebounded six months from now, the interim period will throw the entire sector (and many countries) into crisis. It is in the nature of markets to overshoot; it is not inconceivable (though I think unlikely) that the lows of late 2008 ($35 a barrel) will again be tested.
More to come.




















